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Abstract
Modern literature departs from time-separable constant relative risk aversion preferences to
explain asset pricing facts. This deviation typically implies that wealth shocks generate transitory
variations in agentsrelative risk aversion and, possibly, portfolio re-allocations over time.
I empirically analyze this relationship using U.S. macroeconomic data and nd evidence for time-
variation in portfolio shares that is consistent with counter-cyclical risk aversion. These results
suggest, therefore, that wealth-dependent, habit-formation or loss and disappointment aversion
utility functions are a good description of preferences.
Controlling for observed versus expected asset returns, I also show that: (i) wealth e¤ects are
signicant (although temporary) and there is no evidence of inertia contrary to Brunnermeier and
Nagel (2006); and (ii) the consumption-wealth ratio (Lettau and Ludvigson, 2001), the labor income
risk (Julliard, 2004) and the labor income-consumption ratio (Santos and Veronesi, 2006) partially
explain changes in the risky asset share.
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1 Introduction
Time-separable utility functions with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) are commonly used
in macroeconomics and asset pricing. An important implication of this kind of preferences is that
shocks to an agents wealth leave his relative risk aversion (RRA) unchanged. A growing number of
studies have recently explored alternative preferences that allow wealth shocks to generate transitory
e¤ects on relative risk aversion. The ways by which these e¤ects take place include: (i) habit-formation
preferences;1 (ii) agents may care about relative social status or have direct preferences over wealth;2
and (iii) agents may have loss or disappointment aversion preferences.3
These modications are appealing because they help explain the counter-cyclicality of risk premia
in asset markets and they seem plausible from a psychological perspective. However, whilst researchers
have typically focused on time-variation in risk premium, the models also imply time-variation on
portfolio shares, an implication that has not yet been put into a rigorous empirical test.4
Moreover and despite the apparent agreement regarding the counter-cyclical pattern of risk aversion
(Cochrane, 1997; Guvenen, 2004), the empirical evidence on the relationship between wealth shocks and
relative risk aversion is not consensual and the analysis has mostly been centered on the unconditional
equity premium (instead of time-variation in risk aversion) using household level data.5 Brunnermeier
and Nagel (2006) provide the rst test to the assumption of constant relative risk aversion, but conclude
that wealth shocks do not prompt households to change the allocation of their nancial wealth between
risky and riskless assets.
Whilst representing an important result, the estimates of wealth e¤ects on asset allocation based on
household level data are likely to be under-estimated due to the poor coverage at the top-level of wealth
1Consumers may look at changes in wealth as isolated shocks with persistent e¤ects (Campbell, 1998). Campbell
and Cochrane (1999) suggest that agents are more risk averse during troughs and that a positive wealth shock leads
to a transitory decrease in relative risk aversion. These e¤ects largely depend on how quickly habit adjusts (Dunn and
Singleton, 1986; Abel, 1990; Boldrin et al., 1995; Heaton, 1995).
2 In this case, wealth has consumption characteristics due to, for example, the social status that it provides and
directly a¤ects portfolio decisions (Robson, 1992; Bakshi and Chen, 1996; St-Amour, 2005). Carroll (1997) emphasizes
the accumulation of wealth as an end by itself. Cole et al. ( 1992, 1995) and Corneo and Jeanne (1999) focus instead on
the role of wealth as determining status, a ranking mechanism that determines the allocation of non-marketed goods.
3See, for example, Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Gul (1991), Tversky and Kahneman (1991), Barberis et al. (2001),
Fielding and Stracca, (2003), and Routledge and Zin (2003).
4Cox et al. (1985) and Lo and Wang (2001) suggest that portfolios that contain dynamic hedging strategies against
unfavorable shifts in the state variable are qualitatively similar to those obtained under time-varying investment sets, and
result in time-varying portfolio shares.
5See, for example, Friend and Blume (1975), Cohn et al (1975), Blake (1996), Morin and Fernandez Suarez (1983)
and Guiso and Paiella (2001).
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distribution where the exposure to risky assets is largest. On the other hand, the majority of works
on portfolio composition share a common weakness: as they rely on cross sectional data, the e¤ects of
time-variation of asset prices, expected returns and volatility are not taken into account.6
In this paper, I test the assumption of constant relative risk aversion using U.S. quarterly data for the
period 1953:4 - 2004:4. I use macroeconomic data to look at the relationship between unexpected wealth
variation and changes of the risky asset allocation in aggregate portfolios. The results show that the risky
asset share exhibits a cyclical behavior and it is signicantly (and positively) a¤ected by wealth shocks.
There is, therefore, evidence suggesting that risk aversion is counter-cylical and supporting the existence
of preferences that depart from the assumption of constant relative risk aversion.7 This in accordance
with cross-sectional evidence on portfolios which show that: stockholders are (i) wealthier (Poterba,
2000; Ait-Sahalia et al., 2004; Reynard, 2004); (ii) have a larger elasticity of inter-temporal substitution
(Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002; Guvenen, 2006); and (iii) have a lower degree of risk aversion.(Mankiw and
Zeldes, 1991; Attanasio et al., 2002; Brav et al., 2002). By its turn, a fall of the share of housing wealth
tends to be associated with positive unexpected wealth variation, which highlights the possibility of the
use of housing assets as an hedge against unfavorable states.8
I then show that the relationship that one observes between wealth shocks and changes in the
portfolio composition does not reect possible price e¤ects, that is, changes in the price of nancial
assets, housing assets or the relative price of assets are not responsible for the time-variation of the
risky asset share. Additionally, there is some weak evidence suggesting that housing returns or holding
gains on housing assets (but not nancial returns or holding gains in corporate equities) play a role
in wealth allocation. This asymmetric behavior may be related with agents looking at changes in
nancial returns as transitory and perceiving changes in housing returns as persistent. Despite this, the
empirical ndings are still robust to asset return e¤ects and conrm that wealth shocks are important
determinants of agentsrisk aversion.
One potential drawback of the previous results is that time varying portfolio shares may be simply
reecting time-variation in the expectations about future returns and/or in the volatility of returns.
6Heaton and Lucas (2000) and Guiso et al. (2003) show that, conditional on stock market participation, the cross-
sectional relationship between the risky asset share and the level of wealth is essentially at. Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)
and Paiella (2005) emphasize the importance of participation costs as determining risky asset allocation.
7Cochrane (1997) and Guvenen (2004) also suggest that risk aversion is counter-cyclical, based on the counter-
cyclicality of excess returns. Melino and Yian (2003) and Gordon and St-Amour (2000, 2004) emphasize the role of direct
preferences over wealth to achieve the same conclusion.
8Cocco (2000) analyzes the benets of housing as a hedge against income shocks. Englund et al. (2002) and Iacoviello
and Ortalo-Magné (2003) show the importance of housing as a hedge against the risk of nancial portfolios. Sinai and
Souleles (2005) point out its benets as a hedge against rent risk.
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In fact, at the time of wealth shocks, future returns on assets can only be predicted and the mapping
of risk aversion into risky asset shares is only valid when those e¤ects are taken into account and
correctly identied. Therefore, I control for changes in expected asset returns and in the volatility of
asset returns. The empirical ndings suggest that some empirical proxies developed by the literature
on asset pricing to capture time-variation in expected returns, such as the consumption-wealth ratio
(Lettau and Ludvigson, 2001), the labor income risk (Julliard, 2004) and the labor income-consumption
ratio (Santos and Veronesi, 2006), partially explain the changes observed in risky asset allocation.
However, the estimations show that wealth shocks remain signicant and are responsible for the bulk
of the variation, consistent with preferences that deviate from the assumption of constant relative risk
aversion.
Considering a variety of wealth denitions, it is shown that, although signicant, wealth e¤ects
on asset allocation are mainly temporary: the explanatory power of wealth shocks quickly falls over
horizons of three quarters, therefore, providing evidence against the existence of long-run e¤ects on asset
composition. Additionally and contrary to the ndings of Brunnermeier and Nagel (2006), there is weak
evidence of inertia or slow adjustment in asset allocation, as agents quickly rebalance the composition
of their portfolios following to wealth shocks.
Finally, as a robustness check of the previous results, I analyze the importance of wealth e¤ects
on asset allocation in a Bayesian framework. I estimate a reduced-form Vector Autoregressive Model
(VAR) and show that: (i) lagged changes in wealth do not explain the changes in the risky asset
share, suggesting that wealth e¤ects on asset allocation are transitory and there is no inertia on asset
allocation; (ii) lagged returns do not forecast future returns, but cay contains important predictive
power, consistent with the ndings of Lettau and Ludvigson (2001). Using a Markov Chain Monte
Carlo algorithm to compute the error bands of the impulse-response functions to an aggregate wealth
shock, I show that unexpected wealth variation has a positive (although temporary) e¤ect on the risky
asset share and that agents quickly rebalance their portfolios and the e¤ect erodes over the next four
quarters.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical and econometric approach. Sec-
tion 3 describes the data, estimates the wealth e¤ects on portfolio allocation and checks the robustness
of the results. In Section 4, I control for the e¤ects of expected returns on asset allocation. In Section
5, I address the issues of long-run wealth e¤ects and inertia. In Section 6, I present a reduced form
Vector Autoregressive Model (VAR) and analyze the importance of wealth e¤ects on asset allocation
in a more structural framework. Finally, in Section 7, I conclude and discuss the implications of the
ndings.
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2 Theory and Econometric Approach
2.1 Wealth E¤ects on Asset Allocation
Consider the optimal portfolio choice of an investor with habit-formation preferences and continuous
time.9 Assume, as in Campbell and Cochrane (1999), that agents have power utility with additive habit,
that is,
U(C) = E
1Z
0
e t
(Ct  Xt)1 
1   dt; (1)
which converges to a log-utility function for  = 1.10 Following Sundaresan (1989), Constantinides
(1990) and Ingersoll (1992), Xt, the habit level, is internal, and depends on past consumption according
to the following law
Xt = b
tZ
0
e a(t s)Csds+ e atX0; (2)
with b > 0. Current consumption at the habit level increases Xt at a rate of b, while the impact of past
consumption depreciates at a rate of a.
The investor chooses consumption, Ct, and the share of wealth invested in risky assets, t, to
maximize expected utility, subject to
dWt = (p;tWt   Ct)dt+ p;tWtdZt; (3)
where p;t := rt + t(t   rt) is the expected instantaneous return on wealth, p;t is the instantaneous
volatility of the return on wealth, rt is the instantaneous return on the risk-free asset, and t is the
drift of the risky asset return process. The wealth process is driven by a deterministic component
(p;tWt  Ct)dt and a stochastic component that contains a one-dimensional Brownian motion Zt, and
p;t and p;t depend on the agents portfolio choice, i.e. t, and, possibly, Zt (time-varying investment
opportunities).
Following Schroder and Skiadas (2002), it is possible to derive an isomorphism between optimal
portfolio selection of an agent with habit formation preferences (b > 0) and an agent without habit
formation (X0 = 0 and b = 0). In the case of constant risk-free rate, the habit-utility agents investment
in the risky asset, t, is11
t = (1  Xt
Wt
1
r + (a  b) )
^
t; (4)
9 In this Subsection, I follow Brunnermeier and Nagel (2006).
10An utility function with multiplicative habit of the form U(C) = E
1R
0
e t (Ct=Xt)
1 
1  dt does not exhibit time-varying
risk aversion.
11Shore and White (2003) derive a tractable relationship in an external habit setting.
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where
^
t is the corresponding risky asset share for an agent without habit. With constant investment
opportunities, i.e. constant expected risky asset return and volatility,
^
t would be constant. In contrast,
an agent with habit preferences invests the rst Xtr+(a b) dollars in the risk-free asset in order to secure
a minimum consumption equal to future expected habit. Only then, a constant fraction of the surplus
wealth will be invested in the risky asset.
In Appendix B, it is shown that the log risky asset share, i.e. t := log(t), follows the process
dt = (
^
t
t
  1)
("
w;t   x;t  
^
t
2t
2p;t
#
dt+ p;tdZt
)
; (5)
where wt := log(Wt), xt := log(Xt), and x;t and w;t are the instantaneous drifts of the wt and
xt processes. Since surplus wealth rises when the agent receives a positive wealth shock, one could
intuitively infer that this leads to an increase in the optimal portfolio share of the risky asset. That is,
everything else equal, an unexpected wealth shock of 1 percent increases the fraction invested in the
risky asset, t, by (
^
t
t
  1) percent. However, this shift in asset allocation is not permanent: over time,
as the habit catches up with the new wealth level (i.e. x;t > w;t), the risky asset share mean-reverts,
and the initial impact of the unexpected wealth shock erodes. Consequently, one can not say a priori
what is the direction of the e¤ects of unexpected wealth variation on the share of risky assets, and this
work aims at providing more light about it.
2.2 Econometric Specication
I use the approximate discrete-time counterpart to Equation (5) to estimate the impact of wealth
shocks on portfolio composition. Wealth shocks are computed in two ways. First, I use the standard
set of Box-Jenkins selection procedures to determine the best tting for wealth growth and then use the
residuals, "t, as a proxy for unexpected wealth variation. In this case, among the models considered,
the Akaike information, the Schwarz and the Hanan-Quinn criteria suggest that the data-generating
process that ts better wealth growth is the ARMA(2,3) model. I hence restrict the attention to the
ARIMA(2,1,3) specication for wealth. Appendix C describes in detail the computation of the wealth
shock, "t.12 Second, I estimate a reduced form cointegrated vector auto-regressive model (VAR) for
consumption growth, ct, wealth growth, wt, and labor income growth, yt and then use the residuals
of the equation for wealth growth, wt , as a proxy for wealth shocks.
13
12 I also use a Kalman lter to extract the innovation component of the wealth growth process and use it as a proxy
for unexpected wealth variation. The results, however, do not change signicantly.
13 I also estimate the VAR without imposing cointegration, but the results do not change signicantly.
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The starting point for the econometric specication is, therefore,
t = 0 + 1"t + ut; (6)
where t := t   t 1 denotes the rst-di¤erence in the log portfolio share of risky assets, "t is an
unexpected wealth shock at time t, and ut is a random disturbance uncorrelated with "t.
In the second case, I specify the following cointegrated vector auto-regressive model (VAR) for
consumption growth, ct, wealth growth, wt, and labor income growth, yt:
Xt =  + t
0
tXt 1 +  (L)Xt 1 + t; (7)
where Xt = (ct; wt; yt) is the vector of consumption, aggregate wealth, and labor income, t =
(c; w; y)
0 is a (4  1) vector, t = (1; w; y)0 is the vector of estimated cointegration coe¢ -
cients,  (L) is a nite-order distributed lag operator, t = (
c
t ; 
w
t ; 
y
t ) is a vector of disturbance terms
and  is a vector of constants. Thus, t is the short-run adjustment vector telling us how the variables
react to the last periods cointegrating error while returning to long-term equilibrium after a deviation;
t measures the long-run elasticities of one variable respective to another; and the term 
0
tXt 1 mea-
sures the cointegrating residual. Following Campbell and Shiller (1988), for small perturbations around
the steady state, the variables included in the VAR should capture most of the relevant information for
wealth changes. Therefore, the residuals of the equation for wealth growth, wt , shall be a good proxy
for wealth shocks and I regress:
t = 0 + 1
w
t + ut: (8)
Equations (6) and (8) shall provide a robust test to the assumption of constant relative risk aversion:
if wealth shocks are important determinants of transitory risk aversion, the coe¢ cient will be signicant
and this will a piece of evidence supporting preferences that depart from that assumption.14
3 Wealth E¤ects and Asset Allocation
3.1 Data
The main data sources are the Flow of Funds Accounts provided by Federal Reserve System and
BEA of U.S. Department of Commerce. In Appendix A, I present a detailed discussion of data.
14To address the measurement error problem and the potential correlation between the wealth shock proxy and the
disturbance term, I estimate a two-stage least-squares regression using instrumental variables. Whilst some precision is
lost with the use of this estimation, the results are still robust and point in the direction of the signicant wealth e¤ects
on asset alllocation.
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In the estimations, I use quarterly, seasonally adjusted data for U.S., variables are measured at 2000
prices and expressed in the logarithmic form of per capita terms, and the sample period is 1953:4 -
2004:4.
The denition of consumption includes nondurable consumption goods and services. Data on income
includes only after-tax labor income. Aggregate wealth corresponds to net worth of households and
nonprot organizations, that is, the sum of housing wealth and nancial wealth.
Housing wealth (or home equity) is dened as the value of real estate held by households minus
home mortgages. Financial wealth is dened as the sum of nancial assets (deposits, credit market
instruments, corporate equities, mutual fund shares, security credit, life insurance reserves, pension
fund reserves, equity in noncorporate business, and miscellaneous assets) minus nancial liabilities
(credit market instruments excluding home mortgages, security credit, trade payables, and deferred
and unpaid life insurance premiums). Original data on wealth correspond to the end-period values.
Therefore, I lag once the data, so that the observation of wealth in t corresponds to the value at the
beginning of the period t+ 1.
I start by dening 1t as the log share of nancial wealth in total wealth and 
2
t as the log of the share
of housing wealth in total wealth. Then, I consider risky asset holdings as the stock market wealth -
that is, the sum of the value of corporate equities, directly and indirectly held - and denote by 3t the
log share of risky assets in nancial wealth. This is the preferred proxy for agents risk aversion. In
addition, I consider two measures of risky asset holdings: (i) one that includes only risky asset direct
holdings, 4t ; and (ii) another that includes only indirect holdings, 
5
t . In both cases, the risky asset
share is computed as ratios of nancial wealth. 15
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the composition of wealth: while the share of housing wealth exhibits
a counter-cyclical pattern, the other portfolio shares fall during recessions and increase in expansions.
This evidence suggests that housing is an hedge against unfavorable wealth shifts and that risk aversion
is counter-cyclical.
15The estimation results do not change signicantly when di¤erent measures of consumption (including durable goods)
are used or when the risky asset share is measured as a ratio of total wealth.
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Figure 1: Evolution of the composition of wealth.
The picture depicts the evolution of the shares of nancial and housing wealth in total wealth
and the shares of stock market wealth and its components in nancial wealth.
All series are detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) lter and normalized to standard deviations.
The sample period is 1953:4 to 2004:4. Shaded areas denote NBER recessions.
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3.2 Empirical Evidence
The starting points for the estimation of wealth e¤ects on portfolio composition are equation (6)
- where wealth shocks are computed using the residuals of the estimated data-generating process for
wealth growth - and equation (8) - where they are computed as the residuals of the wealth growth
equation in a reduced vector auto-regression model (VAR).
Tables 1 and 2 show a summary of the results. The estimated coe¢ cient on the wealth shock
(respectively, "t and 
w
t ) is positive and signicant and is very similar in both specications. When
the dependent variable is the change in the ratio of stock market wealth to nancial wealth, i.e. the
favourite denition of risky asset share, 3t , the coe¢ cient associated with the wealth shock is large
and positive (respectively, 2.682 and 2.210 in Tables 1 and 2): an unexpected shock of 1% in aggregate
wealth leads to an increase of the share of risky assets by, respectively, 2.682% and 2.210%. The
_
R
2
are
also large (respectively, 0.69 and 0.54), showing that wealth shocks are important determinants of risk
aversion. When the denition of risky asset share is split into directly versus indirectly held risky risky
assets, 4t and 
5
t , it can be seen that wealth e¤ects are stronger in the rst case: both the coe¢ cient
on wealth shocks and the
_
R
2
are larger in magnitude. This is consistent with agents that do not trade
some categories of assets (such as mutual or pension funds). The only exception to the positive e¤ect
of wealth shocks is the share of housing wealth, given that the coe¢ cient is negative. This empirical
nding is important and suggests that housing is an hedge against unexpected wealth variation: in face
of a positive wealth shock, the relative risk aversion falls and the agent reduces the share of housing
assets.
Table 1: Wealth e¤ects in asset allocation - wealth shocks from single equation.
Financial Housing Stock Market Stock Market Wealth, Stock Market Wealth,
Wealth Wealth Wealth Directly. held Indirectly held
1t 
2
t 
3
t 
4
t 
5
t
Constant -0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.013*
(-0.238) (0.219) (1.563) (0.128) (4.645)
"t 0.16* -0.770* 2.682* 2.810* 2.292*
(7.278) (-7.412) (21.291) (11.910) (10.264)
_
R
2
[0.41] [0.45] [0.69] [0.68] [0.57]
Symbols *, **, *** represent, respectively, signicance level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Newey and West (1987) corrected t-statistics appear in parenthesis.
The sample period is 1953:4 to 2004:4.
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Table 2: Wealth e¤ects in asset allocation: wealth shocks from VAR system.
Financial Housing Stock Market Stock Market Wealth Stock Market Wealth
Wealth Wealth Wealth Directly held Indirectly held
1t 
2
t 
3
t 
4
t 
5
t
Constant -0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.013*
(-0.210) (0.190) (1.045) (0.117) (3.908)
wt 0.143* -0.690* 2.210* 2.301* 1.979*
(8.516) (-8.454) (11.632) (12.066) (10.115)
_
R
2
[0.38] [0.41] [0.54] [0.53] [0.49]
Symbols *, **, *** represent, respectively, signicance level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Newey and West (1987) corrected t-statistics appear in parenthesis.
The sample period is 1953:4 to 2004:4.
3.3 Robustness Analysis
3.3.1 Price E¤ects
While the previous regressions suggest that wealth shocks a¤ect portfolio composition, one could
argue that this is just reecting possible changes in the price of corporate equities, or housing prices
or both. Therefore, I control for possible price e¤ects and consider the log change of price of nancial
assets, pft , and the log change of relative price of nancial to housing assets, 

pft
put

as possible
explanatory variables.
Financial prices are measured using the Standard & Poors (S&P 500) Composite Index. Housing
prices are measured using two sources: (a) the Price Index of New One-Family Houses sold including
the Value of Lot provided by the U.S. Census since 1963:1; and (b) the House Price Index computed by
the O¢ ce of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) since 1975:1.
The results are summarized in Tables 3 and 4. For simplicity, only the results that use the Census
Housing Price Index are reported, although the regressions with the OFHEO Housing Price Index
corroborate the major ndings. The evidence of price e¤ects is very weak: only a few coe¢ cients are
statistically signicant and their inclusion does not signicantly change the R2 statistic. Nevertheless,
the signs are consistent with an increase in risky asset share, i.e. an increase in the price of nancial
assets or in the relative price of nancial to housing assets is associated with an increase in the share
of risky assets and a decrease in the share of housing assets.
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Table 3: Asset allocation and nancial price e¤ects.
Financial Housing Stock Market Stock Market Wealth Stock Market Wealth
Wealth Wealth Wealth Directly held Indirectly held
1t 
2
t 
3
t 
4
t 
5
t
Constant -0.000 0.000 0.003 -0.001 0.013*
(-0.301) (0.272) (1.156) (-0.248) (4.638)
"t 0.159* -0.769* 2.671* 2.795* 2.285*
(7.357) -7.489) (11.522) (12.019) (10.243)
pft 0.002 -0.006 0.045 0.057** 0.025
(0.339) (-0.296) (1.596) (2.024) (0.718)
_
R
2
[0.40] [0.44] [0.69] 0.68 [0.57]
Symbols *, **, *** represent, respectively, signicance level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Newey and West (1987) corrected t-statistics appear in parenthesis.
The sample period is 1953:4 to 2004:4.
Table 4: Asset allocation and relative price of assets (Census).
Financial Housing Stock Market Stock Market Wealth Stock Market Wealth
Wealth Wealth Wealth Directly held Indirectly held
1t 
2
t 
3
t 
4
t 
5
t
Constant -0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.010*
(-0.651) (0.636) (0.373) (-0.911) (3.382)
"t 0.155* -0.750* 2.567* 2.693* 2.262*
(6.268) (-6.394) (10.418) (10.928) (9.217)

pft
put
0.001 -0.006 0.039 0.048*** 0.033
(0.251) (-0.224) (12.54) (1.634) (0.776)
_
R
2
[0.38] [0.43] [0.67] [0.66] [0.57]
Symbols *, **, *** represent, respectively, signicance level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Newey and West (1987) corrected t-statistics appear in parenthesis.
The sample period is 1963:2 to 2004:4.
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3.3.2 Asset Return E¤ects
Another channel that may a¤ect portfolio composition is through asset returns. The previous
ndings may be capturing changes in asset returns instead of the e¤ects of wealth shocks per se. I,
therefore, add returns on nancial assets, rt, and returns on housing assets, rut , as explanatory variables.
The results are summarized in Tables 5 and 6 and Appendix A presents the computation of returns.
Whilst nancial returns do not play any role in wealth allocation, there is weak evidence suggesting
that housing returns are important. This asymmetric behavior may be related with agents looking at
changes in nancial returns as transitory and perceiving changes in housing returns as persistent.
Table 5: Asset Allocation and returns on nancial assets.
Financial Housing Stock Market Stock Market Wealth Stock Market Wealth
Wealth Wealth Wealth Directly held Indirectly held
1t 
2
t 
3
t 
4
t 
5
t
Constant -0.000 0.000 0.003 -0.000 0.013
(-0.295) (0.263) (1.263) (-0.134) (4.724)
"t 0.160* -0.770* 2.680* 2.806* 2.291*
(7.252) (-7.386) (11.569) (12.096) (10.234)
rt 0.001 -0.005 0.030 0.042 0.005
(0.337) (-0.277) (1.220) (1.617) (0.199)
_
R
2
[0.41] [0.44] [0.69] [0.68] [0.57]
Symbols *, **, *** represent, respectively, signicance level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Newey and West (1987) corrected t-statistics appear in parenthesis.
The sample period is 1953:4 to 2004:4.
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Table 6: Asset allocation and housing returns.
Financial Housing Stock Market Stock Market Wealth Stock Market Wealth
Wealth Wealth Wealth Directly held Indirectly held
1t 
2
t 
3
t 
4
t 
5
t
Constant 0.001** -0.006** 0.005 0.002 0.017*
(2.158) (-2.008) (1.058) (0.301) (3.693)
"t 0.168* -0.807* 2.689* 2.817* 2.316*
(8.347) (-8.492) (11.218) (11.651) (10.106)
rut -0.073* 0.318** -0.056 -0.060 -0.211
(-2.616) (2.403) (-0.287) (-0.278) (-1.114)
_
R
2
[0.44] [0.47] [0.69] [0.68] [0.57]
Symbols *, **, *** represent, respectively, signicance level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Newey and West (1987) corrected t-statistics appear in parenthesis.
The sample period is 1953:4 to 2004:4.
3.3.3 Holding Gains and Net Acquisitions of Assets
In this Subsection, I test for other potential sources of variation in portfolio composition. In
particular, I control for the e¤ects of holding gains and net acquisition of assets which may be driving
the changes in the risky asset allocation.
Holding gains are calculated as the change in amount outstanding less net purchases during the
period and the e¤ects of holding gains in corporate equities, (stock gains)t, and holding gains in real
estate, (housing gains)t are shown in Tables 7 and 8. Consistent with the previous ndings, the
results suggest that stock gains have no e¤ect on portfolio allocation, but housing gains are important.
This duality may be associated with the beliefs that stock gains are transitory and housing gains are
persistent. Despite this, the coe¢ cient associated with wealth shocks, "t, and the R2 statistic do not
change signicantly, further reinforcing that these are important determinants of asset allocation.
As a nal robustness check, I test the impact of the net acquisition of corporate equities, (stock
purchases)t, and the net acquisition of mortgages, (mortgages)t, and include them as explanatory
variables in di¤erent specications. The results are summarized in Tables 9 and 10: whilst there is
evidence suggesting that net acquisition of corporate equities prompt agents to increase the proportion
of wealth invested in risky assets, net acquisition of mortgages has no e¤ect on asset allocation.
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Table 7: Asset allocation and holding gains in corporate equities.
Financial Housing Stock Market Stock Market Wealth Stock Market Wealth
Wealth Wealth Wealth Directly held Indirectly held
1t 
2
t 
3
t 
4
t 
5
t
Constant -0.000 0.000 0.004 -0.000 0.013*
(-0.330) (0.310) (1.225) (-0.103) (4.669)
"t 0.160* -0.771* 2.685* 2.810* 2.292*
(7.187) (-7.314) (11.588) (12.162) (10.230)
(stock gains)t 0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.003 -0.000
(0.663) (-0.594) (0.966) (1.550) (-0.087)
_
R
2
[0.41] [0.44] [0.69] [0.68] [0.57]
Symbols *, **, *** represent, respectively, signicance level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Newey and West (1987) corrected t-statistics appear in parenthesis.
The sample period is 1953:4 to 2004:4.
Table 8: Asset allocation and holding gains in real estate.
Financial Housing Stock Market Stock Market Wealth Stock Market Wealth
Wealth Wealth Wealth Directly held Indirectly held
1t 
2
t 
3
t 
4
t 
5
t
Constant 0.000* -0.005* 0.009* -0.011* 0.021*
(2.882) (-2.724) (2.603) (-3.007) (5.884)
"t 0.164* -0.787* 2.698* 2.831* 2.315*
(7.902) (-7.985) (11.218) (12.082) (10.097)
(housing gains)t -0.003* 0.014* -0.013** -0.017* -0.020*
(-4.192) (4.048) (-2.059) (-2.526) (-2.746)
_
R
2
[0.46] [0.49] [0.69] [0.72] [0.58]
Symbols *, **, *** represent, respectively, signicance level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Newey and West (1987) corrected t-statistics appear in parenthesis.
The sample period is 1953:4 to 2004:4.
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Table 9: Asset allocation and net acquisition of corporate equities.
Financial Housing Stock Market Stock Market Wealth Stock Market Wealth
Wealth Wealth Wealth Directly held Indirectly held
1t 
2
t 
3
t 
4
t 
5
t
Constant 0.000 -0.000 0.006** 0.002 0.015*
(0.278) (-0.243) (-1.913) (0.617) (5.579)
"t 0.161* -0.777* 2.697* 2.824* 2.311*
(7.461) (-7.507) (11.454) (11.901) (10.325)
(stock purchases)t 0.002* -0.009** 0.021** 0.021** 0.026*
(2.585) (-2.433) (2.118) (1.956) (2.670)
_
R
2
[0.42] [0.46] [0.70] [0.69] [0.59]
Symbols *, **, *** represent, respectively, signicance level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Newey and West (1987) corrected t-statistics appear in parenthesis.
The sample period is 1953:4 to 2004:4.
Table 10: Asset allocation and net acquisition of mortgages.
Financial Housing Stock Market Stock Market Wealth Stock Market Wealth
Wealth Wealth Wealth Directly held Indirectly held
1t 
2
t 
3
t 
4
t 
5
t
Constant -0.000 0.001 0.004 -0.000 0.013*
(-0.506) (0.491) (1.223) (-0.038) (4.504)
"t 0.161* -0.773* 2.684* 2.813* 2.292*
(7.346) (-7.475) (11.474) (11.911) (10.309)
mortgaget 0.004 -0.017 0.011 -0.018 0.001
(1.434) (-1.475) (0.371) (-0.644) (-0.023)
_
R
2
[0.41] [0.45] [0.69] [0.68] [0.57]
Symbols *, **, *** represent, respectively, signicance level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Newey and West (1987) corrected t-statistics appear in parenthesis.
The sample period is 1953:4 to 2004:4.
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4 Expected Returns and Asset Allocation
One potential drawback of the previous analysis is that it neglects the possibility of time-variation
in the expectations about future returns and in the volatility of returns. Moreover, at the time of wealth
shocks, future returns on assets are not observable and, therefore, can only be predicted. Following
Friend and Blume (1975), the optimal investment in risky assets can be approximated by the following
formula:
t = log
E(rt   rf )
2t
  log ; (9)
where t is the log share of wealth invested in risky assets,  is Pratts measure of relative risk aversion,
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rt and 2t denote, respectively, the return and the variance of the return on the portfolio of risky assets,
and rf is the risk-free interest rate. Given estimates of t and the market price for risk,
E(rt rf )
2t
,
this equation can be used to estimate the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. It, therefore, shows that
time-varying expected returns or volatility of returns may generate transitory variation in portfolio
composition.
I address the issue of time-variation in expected returns using numerous empirical proxies developed
in the literature, namely: the consumption-wealth ratio (Lettau and Ludvigson, 2001), the labor income-
consumption ratio (Santos and Veronesi, 2006), the labor income risk (Julliard, 2004), the composition
risk (Piazzesi et al., 2007), and the housing collateral ratio (Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh, 2005). The
results show that the ARCH or GARCH specications do not t well the wealth growth process, so
it does not capture the time-variation in the volatility of returns. Consequently, the analysis will be
focusing on the e¤ects of time-varying expected returns.
4.1 Consumption-Wealth Ratio
Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) show that uctuations in the consumption-wealth ratio, cay, sum-
marize changes in expected returns and can be used for predicting stock returns. Investors want to
maintain a at consumption path over time and will attempt to "smooth out" transitory movements
in their asset wealth arising from time-variation in asset returns.
In order to capture the e¤ect of changes in expected returns, I include cay as an explanatory variable
for risky asset allocation. I estimate cay as: cayt := ct 0:42wt 0:65yt. Table 11 presents a summary of
the results. It can be seen that the coe¢ cient associated to cay is always signicant: an increase of 1% in
cay generates an increase of 0:349% in the share of stock market wealth. This is consistent with the idea
16 It can be interpreted as the wealth elasticity of the marginal utility of wealth, i.e.  :=  Wt U
00(Wt)
U0(Wt) .
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that investors increase their exposition to risk when they expect higher returns. Note, however, that
the coe¢ cients associated to wealth shocks, as well as the
_
R
2
, are not signicantly di¤erent from those
obtained in previous regressions. The results suggest, therefore, that changes in risky asset allocation
are only partially explained by changes in expected returns.
Table 11: Asset allocation and consumption-wealth ratio.
Financial Housing Stock Market Stock Market Wealth Stock Market Wealth
Wealth Wealth Wealth Directly held Indirectly held
1t 
2
t 
3
t 
4
t 
5
t
Constant 0.000 -0.002 0.008** 0.004 0.0168*
(1.107) (-1.275) (2.336) (1.077) (5.095)
"t 0.166* -0.800* 2.735* 2.858* 2.336*
(7.367) (-7.442) (11.864) (12.260) (10.678)
cayt 0.035* -0.167* 0.294* 0.270** 0.245**
(3.280) (-3.492) (2.737) (2.351) (2.180)
_
R
2
[0.43] [0.47] [0.70] [0.69] [0.58]
Symbols *, **, *** represent, respectively, signicance level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Newey and West (1987) corrected t-statistics appear in parenthesis.
The sample period is 1953:4 to 2004:4.
4.2 Labor Income-Consumption Ratio
Santos and Veronesi (2006) propose a model in which investorsincome has two sources, wages and
dividends, growing stochastically over time. As the fraction of consumption funded by the endowment
ow of labor income - i.e. labor income-consumption ratio, lc - uctuates, the relationship between stock
returns and consumption growth varies, thereby generating changes in the risk premia that investors
require to hold stocks.
In Table 12, I include lc as an explanatory variable of risky asset allocation. The coe¢ cient associated
to lc is small in magnitude and is not signicant in most of the regressions, although the sign is consistent
with the predictions of the theory: an increase of 1% in lc - or a fall in the fraction of consumption
funded by dividends - leads to a decrease of the risky asset share of 0:103%. Moreover, as the coe¢ cients
associated to wealth shocks, as well as the
_
R
2
, do not change signicantly relative to the previous
regressions, the results show that wealth shocks are responsible for most of the variation in portfolio
composition.
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Table 12: Asset allocation and labor income-consumption ratio.
Financial Housing Stock Market Stock Market Wealth Stock Market Wealth
Wealth Wealth Wealth Directly held Indirectly held
1t 
2
t 
3
t 
4
t 
5
t
Constant 0.000 -0.001 0.008** 0.004 0.015*
(0.311) (-0.276) (2.371) (1.026) (4.584)
"t 0.160* -0.769* 2.678* 2.807* 2.290*
(7.031) (-7.202) (11.563) (11.989) (10.253)
lct -0.006 0.024 -0.103** -0.086*** -0.046
(-0.800) (0.699) (-2.164) (-1.664) (-0.942)
_
R
2
[0.41] [0.45] [0.69] [0.68] [0.57]
Symbols *, **, *** represent, respectively, signicance level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Newey and West (1987) corrected t-statistics appear in parenthesis.
The sample period is 1953:4 to 2004:4.
4.3 Labor Income Risk
Julliard (2004) uses the representative consumers budget constraint to derive an equilibrium re-
lation between future labor income growth rates, lr, and expected future asset returns. The author
shows that expectations of high (low) future labor income growth are associated with lower (higher)
stock market excess returns.
In order to capture the e¤ect of labor income risk, lr is added as an explanatory variable of portfolio
composition. The results, summarized in Table 13, show that labor income risk is a source of variation
of risk aversion: the coe¢ cient associated to lr is signicant in the regressions with the share of stock
market wealth, 4t , and the share of directly held risky assets, 
4
t , as the dependent variables. The
coe¢ cients are negative (respectively,  0:704 and  0:806), consistent with a high lr representing a
state of the world in which returns on asset wealth are low, because agents expect to have abundance of
resources in the future to nance consumption. As before, the coe¢ cients associated to wealth shocks
and the
_
R
2
statistics remain basically unchanged, therefore, suggesting that wealth shocks are important
determinants of changes in aggregate portfolio shares.
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Table 13: Asset allocation and labor income risk.
Financial Housing Stock Market Stock Market Wealth Stock Market Wealth
Wealth Wealth Wealth Directly held Indirectly held
1t 
2
t 
3
t 
4
t 
5
t
Constant 0.000 -0.001 0.004 0.001 0.014*
(0.516) (-0.551) (1.506) (0.418) (4.609)
"t 0.139* -0.685* 2.872* 3.020* 2.371*
(6.286) (-6.150) (10.224) (10.635) (8.592)
lrt -0.014 0.058 -0.663** -0.765** -0.331
(-0.459) (0.411) (-1.981) (-2.223) (-0.879)
_
R
2
[0.32] [0.36] [0.68] [0.68] [0.54]
Symbols *, **, *** represent, respectively, signicance level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Newey and West (1987) corrected t-statistics appear in parenthesis.
The sample period is 1953:4 to 2000:4.
4.4 Non-Separability of Preferences
Yogo (2006) shows that when utility is nonseparable in nondurable and durable consumption and
the elasticity of substitution between the two consumption goods is su¢ ciently high, marginal utility
rises when durable consumption falls.17 Stock returns are unexpectedly low at business cycle troughs,
when durable consumption falls sharply, helping to explain the countercyclical variation in the equity
premium. Piazzesi et al. (2007) explicitly model housing both as an asset and a consumption good.
Nonseparable preferences describe householdsconcern with composition risk, that is, uctuations of
the relative share of non-housing in their consumption basket, ', the housing share can be used to
forecast returns on stocks.
The importance of nundurability of preferences in generating transitory risk aversion is tested in
Table 14. It suggests that composition risk does not play a role in asset allocation: the coe¢ cient
associated to ' is not signicant and is small in magnitude in most of the regressions and the
_
R
2
statistics
remain unchanged.
17Pakos (2003) argues that the falling price of durables raised real income and increased the consumption of durables,
i.e. preferences are non-homothetic. On the other hand, Dunn and Singleton (1986) and Eichenbaum and Hansen (1990)
report evidence against separabilility of preferences, but conclude that introducing durables does not help in reducing the
pricing errors for stocks.
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Table 14: Asset allocation and composition risk.
Financial Housing Stock Market Stock Market Wealth Stock Market Wealth
Wealth Wealth Wealth Directly held Indirectly held
1t 
2
t 
3
t 
4
t 
5
t
Constant -0.019*** 0.084** 0.030 -0.001 0.097
(-1.913) (1.980) (0.318) (-0.008) (0.969)
"t 0.159* -0.767* 2.683* 2.810* 2.295*
(7.234) (-7.381) (11.423) (11.874) (10.221)
't -0.091*** 0.412** 0.131 -0.006 0.411
(-1.912) (1.979) (0.278) (-0.012) (0.837)
_
R
2
[0.42] [0.46] [0.69] [0.68] [0.57]
Symbols *, **, *** represent, respectively, signicance level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Newey and West (1987) corrected t-statistics appear in parenthesis.
The sample period is 1953:4 to 2004:4.
4.5 Housing Collateral Ratio
Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005) show that the ratio of housing wealth to human wealth
shifts the conditional distribution of asset prices and consumption growth and helps predicting stock
returns. There are two main channels that transmit shocks originated in the housing market to the
risk premia in asset markets: (i) when housing prices fall, collateral is destroyed and households are
more exposed to idiosyncratic income risk; (ii) households want to hedge against rental price shocks or
composition shocks when the utility function is nonseparable in nondurable consumption and housing
services. Housing provides, therefore, utility and collateral services.
The aggregate stock of housing collateral is measured using the value of residential xed assets
(structures), hvfa. The housing collateral ratio, myfa, is then computed as the deviation from the
cointegration relationship between the value of the aggregate housing stock and the aggregate labor
income (both when the coe¢ cient associated with income, $, is restricted to be equal to  1 and is
freely estimated) and added as an explanatory variable. Appendix A provides a detailed description.
Tables 15 and 16 present a summary of the results and show that myfa is not an important
determinant of risk aversion, as the estimated coe¢ cients are not signicant. In addition, the coe¢ cients
associated to wealth shocks remain signicant and the
_
R
2
are similar to those previously found.
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Table 15: Asset allocation and housing collateral ratio ($= 1).
Financial Housing Stock Market Stock Market Wealth Stock Market Wealth
Wealth Wealth Wealth Directly held Indirectly held
1t 
2
t 
3
t 
4
t 
5
t
Constant -0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.013*
(-0.253) (0.232) (1.412) (0.130) (4.713)
"t 0.159* -0.765* 2.677* 2.804* 2.287*
(7.132) (-7.278) (11.422) (11.868) (10.220)
myfat -0.003* 0.012* -0.012 -0.015 -0.013
(-2.791) (2.848) (-1.112) (-1.189) (-1.386)
_
R
2
[0.43] [0.47] [0.69] [0.68] [0.57]
Symbols *, **, *** represent, respectively, signicance level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Newey and West (1987) corrected t-statistics in parenthesis. The sample period is 1954:1 to 2004:4.
Table 16: Asset allocation and housing collateral ratio ($ is freely estimated).
Financial Housing Stock Market Stock Market Wealth Stock Market Wealth
Wealth Wealth Wealth Directly held Indirectly held
1t 
2
t 
3
t 
4
t 
5
t
Constant -0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.013*
(-0.253) (0.232) (1.412) (0.130) (4.713)
"t 0.159* -0.765* 2.677* 2.804* 2.287*
(7.132) (-7.278) (11.421) (11.868) (10.220)
myfat -0.013* 0.055* -0.053 -0.066 -0.057
(-2.791) (2.848) (-1.112) (-1.189) (-1.386)
_
R
2
[0.43] [0.47] [0.69] [0.68] [0.57]
Symbols *, **, *** represent, respectively, signicance level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Newey and West (1987) corrected t-statistics in parenthesis. The sample period is 1954:1 to 2004:4.
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5 Long-Run E¤ects and Inertia in Asset Allocation
In this Section, I look at the long-run e¤ects of wealth shocks and explore the issue of inertia in asset
allocation. The previous regressions suggest that there are important wealth e¤ects on asset allocation,
but they do not allow us to distinguish between short-run and long-run e¤ects. This distinction is
important because we may want to know whether unexpected wealth variation is better characterized
as producing transitory e¤ects on portfolio composition or as generating persistent e¤ects on asset
allocation.
To assess the long-run e¤ects of wealth shocks, I regress the following specication:
HX
h=0
t+h = 0 + 1"t + ut; (10)
where H represents the number of quarters and the results.
On the other hand, inertia may also play some role on asset allocation. Changes in wealth may
accrue rst in the form of riskless, liquid assets such as checking accounts. Additionally, adjustment
costs (transaction costs or cognitive costs), limited attention or a belief that changes are transitory
may be important. Finally, capital gains and losses on risky assets may have a direct impact on utility
(as in loss aversion preferences or narrow framing of risks) or on beliefs about future returns (trend-
chasing). In these circumstances, agents will gradually adjust their portfolio composition, implying that
the previous regressions using contemporaneous wealth shocks and risky asset holdings are downward
biased.
To address the issue of inertia in asset allocation, I include the lag of the change in the portfolio
share, t 1, as an explanatory variable and regress the following specication:
HX
h=0
t+h = 0 + 1"t + 2t 1 + ut; (11)
where T represents the number of quarters. If inertia results from adjustment costs that are traded o¤
against the benets of rebalancing, then there could be inertia in the short run, but the share of stock
holdings should revert to its optimal level in the long run. On the other hand, if investors chase returns,
i.e. increase their exposure to risky assets following a positive wealth shock, then long-run e¤ects would
exceed short-run e¤ects.
Table 17 shows that the e¤ects of wealth shocks on the allocation between nancial and housing
assets are mainly transitory: in the case of the share of nancial wealth, 1t , the
_
R
2
falls from 0:41 to
0:15 after 2 quarters and wealth shocks explain only 6% of the changes in portfolio composition over
the next 3 quarters. Moreover, in the face of a positive wealth shock, agents reduce the share of housing
23
assets, that is, housing is an important hedge against unexpected wealth variation. Table 18 conrms
these ndings: the e¤ects of wealth shocks are transitory and in the case of the preferred denition of
risky asset holdings, 3t , the
_
R
2
falls from 0:69 to 0:18 over the next 3 quarters.
By its turn, Tables 19 and 20 suggest that there is very weak evidence of inertia in asset allocation,
as agents strongly rebalance their portfolios following a wealth shock: the coe¢ cient associated to the
lag of the portfolio share, t 1, is not statistically signicant and its magnitude is very close to zero
in most of the regressions. This goes against the ndings of Brunnermeier and Nagel (2006) who argue
that there are important inertia e¤ects at the microeconomic level due to the failure of households to
rebalance following capital gains and losses.
These results, therefore, show that the estimates of the wealth e¤ects on asset allocation based on
household level data are likely to be under-estimated: due to the poor coverage at the top-level of
wealth distribution, where the exposure to risky assets is largest, a large component of the variation of
wealth is not captured at the microeconomic level and, as a consequence, the estimates tend to be biased
towards rejecting the existence of wealth e¤ects. The use of macroeconomic data avoids this problem
and the empirical ndings clearly indicate that the risky asset share exhibits a cyclical behavior, whilst
housing is an hedge against unexpected wealth variation.
Table 17: Long-run e¤ects of wealth shocks on asset allocation - nancial and housing wealth.
Horizon H
Regressor 0 1 2 3
Panel A: Financial Wealth,
HX
h=0
1t+h
"t 0.160* 0.141* 0.145* 0.139*
(7.278) (4.742) (3.776) (3.135)
_
R
2
[0.41] [0.15] [0.09] [0.06]
Panel B: Housing Wealth,
HX
h=0
2t+h
"t -0.770* -0.686* -0.686* -0.673*
(-7.412) (-4.923) (-3.791) (-3.133)
_
R
2
[0.45] [0.16] [0.10] [0.07]
Symbols *, ** and *** represent signicance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Newey and West (1987) corrected t-statistics appear in parenthesis.
The sample period is 1953:4 to 2004:4.
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Table 18: Long-run e¤ects of wealth shocks on asset allocation - stock market wealth.
Horizon H
Regressor 0 1 2 3
Panel A: Stock Market Wealth,
HX
h=0
3t+h
"t 2.682* 2.693* 2.724* 2.780*
(21.291) (7.052) (6.014) (5.495)
_
R
2
[0.69] [0.33] [0.22] [0.18]
Panel B: Stock Market Wealth, directly held,
HX
h=0
4t+h
"t 2.810* 2.770* 2.815* 2.906*
(11.910) (6.964) (5.907) (5.310)
_
R
2
[0.68] [0.31] [0.21] [0.17]
Panel C: Stock Market Wealth, indirectly held,
HX
h=0
5t+h
"t 2.292* 2.369* 2.413* 2.380*
(10.264) (7.073) (6.096) (5.746)
_
R
2
[0.57] [0.29] [0.21] [0.16]
Symbols *, ** and *** represent signicance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Newey and West (1987) corrected t-statistics appear in parenthesis.
The sample period is 1953:4 to 2004:4.
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Table 19: Inertia in asset allocation: nancial and housing wealth.
Horizon H
Regressor 0 1 2 3
Panel A: Financial Wealth,
HX
h=0
1t+h
Constant -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-0.280) (-0.210) (-0.305) (-0.438)
"t 0.1604* 0.142* 0.146* 0.140*
(11.983) (6.064) (4.722) (3.748)
1t 1 0.098*** 0.168*** 0.195 0.243
(1.817) (1.766) (1.559) (1.607)
_
R
2
[0.41] [0.16] [0.10] [0.7]
Panel B: Housing Wealth,
HX
h=0
2t+h
Constant 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.222) (0.139) (0.171) (0.221)
"t -0.772* -0.689* -0.690* -0.678*
(-7.430) (-5.074) (-3.902) (-3.247)
2t 1 0.080 0.163 0.202 0.270
(1.584) (1.453) (1.229) (1.400)
_
R
2
[0.45] [0.17] [0.11] [0.08]
Symbols *, ** and *** represent signicance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Newey and West (1987) corrected t-statistics appear in parenthesis. The sample period is 1953:4 to 2004:4.
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Table 20: Inertia in asset allocation: stock market wealth.
Horizon H
Regressor 0 1 2 3
Panel A: Stock Market Wealth,
HX
h=0
3t+h
Constant 0.004 0.008 0.012 0.016
(1.358) (1.274) (1.191) (1.169)
"t 2.681* 2.693* 2.725* 2.781*
(11.681) (7.032) (5.982) (5.455)
3t 1 0.054*** 0.000 -0.023 -0.043
(1.598) (0.005) (-0.172) (-0.318)
_
R
2
[0.69] [0.32] [0.22] [0.17]
Panel B: Stock Market Wealth, Directly held,
HX
h=0
4t+h
Constant 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.140) (0.208) (0.198) (0.150)
"t 2.806* 2.769* 2.816* 2.907*
(20.849) (9.587) (7.433) (6.488)
4t 1 0.040 0.009 -0.007 -0.006
(1.000) (0.105) (-0.065) (-0.047)
_
R
2
[0.68] [0.31] [0.21] [0.16]
Panel C: Stock Market Wealth, Indirectly held,
HX
h=0
5t+h
Constant 0.012* 0.027* 0.041* 0.054*
(4.365) (4.324) (4.138) (4.182)
"t 2.300* 2.367* 2.405 2.370*
(10.526) (7.058) (5.985) (5.607)
5t 1 0.068*** -0.017 -0.064 -0.082
(1.817) (-0.184) (-0.462) (-0.667)
_
R
2
[0.58] [0.29] [0.21] [0.16]
Symbols *, ** and *** represent signicance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Newey and West (1987) corrected t-statistics appear in parenthesis. The sample period is 1953:4 to 2004:4.
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6 Asset Allocation in a VAR Framework: a Skeptical Look
As a robustness check of the previous results, I analyze the importance of wealth e¤ects on asset
allocation in a more structural framework. I estimate the following Vector Autoregressive Model (VAR)
Xt =  +B(L)Xt 1 +	Zt 1 +t; (12)
whereXt = (t;wt;ct;yt; rt) is the vector of the change of share of risky assets in nancial wealth,
wealth growth, consumption growth, income growth, and real returns on nancial assets, B(L) is a nite-
order distributed lag operator, Zt 1 = (cayt 1; dt 1   pt 1; RRELt 1; DEF1t 1; DEF2t 1; TRMt 1)
is a vector of exogenous variables including the consumption-wealth ratio, the dividend yield, the relative
bill rate, the default rates (the Moodys BAA corporate bond rate minus the AAA corporate bond rate
and the Moodys BAA corporate bond yield minus the 10-year Treasury bond yield) and the term
spread (the 10-year Treasury bond yield minus the 3-month Treasury bond yield), 	 is a matrix of
coe¢ cients associated with Zt 1, t is a vector of error terms, and  is a vector of constants.18
Using the VAR in specication (12), I assess the e¤ect of a wealth shock.19 Under a di¤use prior,
the posterior distribution of the estimated VAR can be factorized as the product of an inverse Wishart
and, conditional on the covariance matrix, a multivariate normal distribution
j  N(
^
;
 (X 0X) 1)
 1 Wishart((n
^
) 1; n m)
where  is the vector of VAR coe¢ cients,  is the covariance matrix of the residuals, the variables with
a hat denote the corresponding estimates, X is the matrix of regressors, n is the sample size and m is
the number of estimated parameters (Zellner, 1971; Schervish, 1995; Bauwens et al., 1999).20 I compute
50,000 draws from the posterior distribution of the VAR coe¢ cients and report 95 percent condence
intervals from the Monte Carlo iterations. The procedure is described in Appendix E.
Table 21 summarizes the results and shows that: (i) lagged changes in wealth do not explain the
changes in the risky asset share, suggesting that wealth e¤ects on asset allocation are transitory and
there is no inertia on asset allocation; and (ii) lagged returns do not forecast future returns, but cay
contains important predictive power, consistent with the ndings of Lettau and Ludvigson (2001).
Figure 2 shows the impulse-response functions to a wealth shock. Consistently, wealth shocks have a
18The selected optimal lag length is 1, in accordance with ndings from Akaike and Schwarz tests.
19The Granger Causality tests with 4 lags clearly indicate that causality runs one-way from wealth shocks to asset
allocation.
20This result is exact under normality and the Je¤reys prior f(;)1jj (p+1)=2 (where p is the number of left hand
side variables), but can also be obtained as an asymptotic approximation around the posterior MLE.
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positive (although temporary) e¤ect on the risky asset share. Following a shock, agents rebalance their
portfolios, wealth mean-reverts and the e¤ect erodes over the next four quarters.
Table 21: Stock market wealth: estimates from vector-autoregressions (VAR).
Equation
Dependent variable t wt ct yt rt
t 1 0.047 -0.013 0.006 0.018 -0.372**
(1.240) (-0.623) (0.716) (0.967) (-2.060)
wt 1 -0.180 0.022 -0.031 -0.090 1.227**
(-1.434) (0.325) (-1.096) (-1.457) (2.071)
ct 1 -0.137 0.165 0.179* 0.464* 0.451
(-0.425) (0.962) (2.478) (2.935) (0.296)
yt 1 -0.070 0.134 0.077** -0.120 -0.244
(-0.443) (1.589) (2.177) (-1.548) (-0.326)
rt 1 0.721* 0.221* 0.015* 0.020** -0.065
(42.451) (24.471) (3.923) (2.372) (-0.808)
Constant -0.067** 0.003 0.015** -0.013 0.137
(-2.110) (0.202) (2.118) (-0.839) (0.905)
cayt 1 0.018 -0.043 -0.076* -0.037 1.260*
(0.205) (-0.930) (-3.868) (-0.866) (3.047)
dt 1   pt 1 -1.262*** 0.124 0.251*** -0.362 -1.823
(-1.908) (0.353) (1.693) (-1.114) (0.582)
RRELt 1 -0.075 0.249* -0.019 -0.049 -1.514**
(-0.493) (3.072) (-0.562) (-0.650) (-2.104)
DEF1t 1 0.477 -0.315 -0.170 -0.311 -0.099
(0.582) (-0.720) (-0.924) (-0.773) (0.025)
DEF2t 1 -0.173 0.193 0.021 0.076 -0.688
(-0.422) (0.880) (0.230) (0.379) (-0.353)
TRMt 1 0.017 0.126*** 0.099* 0.069 -0.556
(0.132) (1.851) (3.432) (1.092) (-0.916)
_
R
2
[0.93] [0.80] [0.25] [0.11] [0.09]
This table reports the estimated coe¢ cients from vector-autoregressions (VAR).
Symbols *, **, *** represent, respectively, signicance level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Newey-West (1987) corrected t-statistics appear in parenthesis. The sample period is 1953:4 to 2004:4.
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Figure 2: Impulse-response functions to an aggregate wealths shock.
The picture depicts the response to a one standard-deviation shock to aggregate wealth.
95% condence intervals computed using the Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm.
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7 Conclusion
This paper tests the assumption of constant relative risk aversion using U.S. quarterly data for the
period 1953:4 - 2004:4. I use macroeconomic data to analyze the role of wealth shocks in generating
transitory changes in portfolio composition.
The main nding is that the risky asset share exhibits a cyclical behavior and, unlike Brunnermeier
and Nagel (2006), it is signicantly (and positively) a¤ected by wealth shocks. There is, therefore,
evidence suggesting that risk aversion is countercyclical and supporting the existence of preferences
that depart from the assumption of constant relative risk aversion such as habit-formation or wealth-
dependent utility functions. Additionally, it is shown that the share of housing wealth in portfolio falls
when the agent is faced with a positive wealth shock, i.e. housing is a hedge against unexpected wealth
variation.
Looking at the composition of risky asset holdings, the results suggest that wealth e¤ects are slightly
stronger for direct holdings than for indirect holdings. This is in accordance with the ndings of
Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988), Ameriks and Zeldes (2004), Agnew et al. (2003) and Huberman and
Sengmueller (2004), who show that a substantial fraction of agents do not trade at all in some categories
of assets such as retirement accounts.
Controlling for changes in expected asset returns, it is shown that consumption-wealth ratio (Lettau
and Ludvigson, 2001), the labor income risk (Julliard, 2004) and the labor income-consumption ratio
(Santos and Veronesi, 2006) partially explain the changes in risky asset allocation. Nevertheless, wealth
shocks remain important determinants of risk aversion.
Finally, considering a variety of wealth denitions, the empirical ndings suggest that, although
signicant, wealth e¤ects on asset allocation are mainly temporary as agents quickly rebalance the
portfolio composition. In fact, and contrary to Brunnermeier and Nagel (2006), there is weak evidence
of inertia or slow adjustment in asset allocation.
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Appendix
A Data Description
Consumption
Consumption is dened as the expenditure in non-durable consumption goods and services. Data
are quarterly, seasonally adjusted at an annual rate, measured in billions of dollars (2000 prices), in per
capita terms and expressed in the logarithmic form. Series comprises the period 1947:1-2005:4. The
source is U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA Table 2.3.5.
Aggregate Wealth
Aggregate wealth is dened as the net worth of households and nonprot organizations. Data are
quarterly, seasonally adjusted at an annual rate, measured in billions of dollars (2000 prices), in per
capita terms and expressed in the logarithmic form. Series comprises the period 1952:2-2006:1. The
source of information is Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds Accounts, Table
B.100, line 41 (series FL152090005.Q).
Stock market Wealth
Stock market wealth is dened as the sum of value of stocks, directly and indirectly held, namely:
(a) stocks held by households direct property (line 23 of Table B.100 - series FL153064105.Q); (b)
stocks held by private pension funds (line 12 of Table L.118 - series FL573064105.Q); (c) stocks held
by state and local government retirement funds (line 13 of Table L.119 - series FL223064105.Q); (d)
stocks held by federal government retirement funds (line 6 of Table L. 120 - series FL343064105.Q); (e)
stocks held by property-casualty insurance companies (line 10 of Table L.116 - series FL513064003.Q);
(f) stocks held by closed-end funds (line 6 of Table L.123 - series FL553064103.Q); (g) stocks held by
exchange-traded funds (line 12 of Table L.123 - series FL563064103.Q); (h) stocks held by mutual funds
(line 9 of Table L.122 - series FL653064000.Q); and (i) stocks held by life insurance companies (line 12
of Table L.117 - series FL543064105.Q), multiplied by the ratio of reserves of life insurance companies
(lines 17 and 18 of Table L.117 - series FL543140003.Q and series FL543150005.Q) to the total nal
assets of life insurance companies (line 1 of Table L.117 - series FL544090005.Q). This denition follows
Davis e Palumbo (2001). Data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted at an annual rate, measured in billions
of dollars (2000 prices), in per capita terms and expressed in the logarithmic form. Series comprises
the period 1952:2-2006:1. The source of information is Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System,
Flow of Funds Accounts.
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Stock Market wealth, Directly Held
Stock market wealth (directly held) is dened as the sum of value of stocks held by households (line
23 of Table B.100 - series FL153064105.Q). Data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted at an annual rate,
measured in billions of dollars (2000 prices), in per capita terms and expressed in the logarithmic form.
Series comprises the period 1952:2-2006:1. The source of information is Board of Governors of Federal
Reserve System, Flow of Funds Accounts.
Stock Market Wealth, Indirectly Held
Stock market wealth (indirectly held) is dened as the sum of value of: (a) stocks held by private
pension funds (line 12 of Table L.118 - series FL573064105.Q); (b) stocks held by state and local
government retirement funds (line 13 of Table L.119 - series FL223064105.Q); (c) stocks held by federal
government retirement funds (line 6 of Table L. 120 - series FL343064105.Q); (d) stocks held by property-
casualty insurance companies (line 10 of Table L.116 - series FL513064003.Q); (e) stocks held by closed-
end funds (line 6 of Table L.123 - series FL553064103.Q); (f) stocks held by exchange-traded funds (line
12 of Table L.123 - series FL563064103.Q); (g) stocks held by mutual funds (line 9 of Table L.122 -
series FL653064000.Q); and (h) stocks held by life insurance companies (line 12 of Table L.117 - series
FL543064105.Q), multiplied by the ratio of reserves of life insurance companies (lines 17 and 18 of
Table L.117 - series FL543140003.Q and series FL543150005.Q) to the total nal assets of life insurance
companies (line 1 of Table L.117 - series FL544090005.Q). Data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted at
an annual rate, measured in billions of dollars (2000 prices), in per capita terms and expressed in the
logarithmic form. Series comprises the period 1952:2-2006:1. The source of information is Board of
Governors of Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds Accounts.
Non-Stock Market Wealth
Non-Stock market wealth is dened as the di¤erence between aggregate net wealth, held by house-
holds and nonprot organizations (line 41 of Table B.100 - series FL152090005.Q) and stock market
wealth (see previous denition). This denition follows Davis e Palumbo (2001). Data are quarterly,
seasonally adjusted at an annual rate, measured in billions of dollars (2000 prices), in per capita terms
and expressed in the logarithmic form. Series comprises the period 1952:2-2006:1. The source of infor-
mation is Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds Accounts.
After-Tax Labor Income
After-tax labor income is dened as the sum of wage and salary disbursements (line 3), personal
current transfer receipts (line 16) and employer contributions for employee pension and insurance funds
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(line 7) minus personal contributions for government social insurance (line 24), employer contributions
for government social insurance (line 8 ) and taxes. Taxes are dened as: [(wage and salary disburse-
ments (line 3)) / (wage and salary disbursements (line 3)+ proprietorincome with inventory valuation
and capital consumption adjustments (line 9) + rental income of persons with capital consumption
adjustment (line 12) + personal dividend income (line 15) + personal interest income (line 14))] *
(personal current taxes (line 25)). Data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted at annual rates, measured in
billions of dollars (2000 prices), in per capita terms and expressed in the logarithmic form. Series com-
prises the period 1947:1-2005:4. The source of information is U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau
of Economic Analysis, NIPA Table 2.1..
Financial Returns
The proxy chosen for the market return is the value weighted CRSP (CRSP-VW) market return
index. The CRSP index includes NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ, and should provide a better proxy
for market returns than the Standard & Poor (S&P) index since it is a much broader measure. Data
are quarterly, deated by the personal consumption chain-weighted index (2000=100) and expressed in
the logarithmic form. Series comprises the period 1947:2-2004:4. The source of information is Robert
Shillers web site.
Housing Returns
In computing housing returns, I follow Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2006). I construct data on
the log change in the value of the aggregate housing stock (pht+1) and the log change in the dividend
payments on the aggregate housing stock (dht+1). The aggregate housing stock is measured as the value
of residential real estate of the household sector (Flow of Funds Accounts, Board of Governors of Federal
Reserve System, line 4 of Table B.100, series FL155035015.Q). The dividend on aggregate housing
is measured as housing services consumption (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic
Analysis, NIPA Table 2.3.5., line 14). I construct a log price index ph by xing the 1952:1 observation
to 0, and using the log change in prices in each quarter. Likewise, we choose an initial log dividend
level, and construct the dividend index using log dividend growth. The log dividend price ratio dh  ph
is the di¤erence of the log dividend and the log price index. The initial dividend index level is chosen to
match the mean log dividend price ratio to the one on stocks (-4.6155).(In the model the mean dividend
price ratios are the same on all assets.). I use the Campbell-Shiller decomposition:
rht = k +d
h
t + (d
h
t 1   pht 1)  (dht   pht ):
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where  and k are Campbell Shiller linearization constants. In the model, these constants must be the
same for all assets (nancial wealth, housing wealth and human wealth). I use stock market data to pin
down  and k:  := 1
1+da pa = 0:9906 and k :=   log()  (1 ) log( 1  1) = 0:0534. To get the log
real return, we deate the nominal log return by the personal income price deator, the same series used
to deate all other variables. Data are quarterly, deated by the personal consumption chain-weighted
index (2000=100) and expressed in the logarithmic form. Series comprises the period 1952:2-2005:4.
Human Capital Returns
In computing human capital returns, I follow Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2006). The authors use
a standard single-agent model and impute the residual of consumption growth innovations that cannot
be attributed to either news about nancial asset returns or future labor income growth to news about
expected future returns on human wealth. This accounting procedure only depends on the agents
willingness to substitute consumption over time, not her consumption risk preferences. The benchmark
calibration sets the intertemporal elasticity of substitution to 0:28, a compromise between the estimates
of Hall (1988) at the macroeconomic level - close to 0 - and the estimates of Browning, Hansen and
Heckman (2000) at the microeconomic level - around 0:5. Data are quarterly, deated by the personal
consumption chain-weighted index (2000=100) and expressed in the logarithmic form. Series comprises
the period 1952:1-2002:4.
Housing Collateral
Aggregate stock of housing collateral is computed using the current cost of net stock of owner-
occupied and tenant-occupied residential xed assets for non-farm persons (NIPA Fixed Asset Table
2.1., line 59). It includes 1-4 units and 5+ units and is the sum of new units, additions and alterations,
major replacements and mobile homes. The real value of the stock is calculated with a perpetual
inventory method and a geometric depreciation pattern (Katz and Herman, 1997). Depreciation rates
are estimated on the basis of resale prices of used assets and are 1.1% per annum for 1-4 units and
1.4% per annum for 5+ structures. The net stock corresponds to the stock after taking into account
depreciation. The current cost or replacement cost values the real stock refers to market prices. Original
data are annual and are converted to a quarterly frequency using data for residential xed investment
(NIPA Table 1.1.5., line 11). Data comprises the period 1947:1 - 2004:4. The source of information is
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Following Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005), I measure the aggregate stock of housing collateral
using the value of residential xed assets (structures), hvfa. Table A.1 reports the results of the vector
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error correction estimation of the cointegration coe¢ cients:24 hvfat
yt
35 =  [hvfat +$yt + #t+ ] + KX
k=1
Dk
24 hvfat k
yt k
35+ t:
The housing collateral ratio, myfa, is measured as the deviation from the cointegration relationship
between the value of the aggregate housing stock (collateralizable wealth) and the aggregate labor
income (noncollateralizable wealth), i.e.: myfat = log(hvfat) +
^
$ log(yt) +
^
#t+
^
. I also estimate the
cointegrating relationship while imposing the restriction $ =  1.
Table A1: Housing collateral ratio: coe¢ cients of myfat.
Housing Wealth Measure: Fixed Assets, fa
$ # 
Unrestricted
-0.224 -0.004 -7.386
(-0.595) (-1.970)
Restricted
-1 -0.019 -32.923
(-2.375)
Symbols *, **, *** represent, respectively, signicance level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Newey and West (1987) corrected t-statistics appear in parenthesis.
The sample period is 1953:4 to 2004:4.
Population
Population was dened by dividing aggregate real disposable income (line 35) by per capita dispos-
able income (line 37). Data are quarterly. Series comprises the period 1946:1-2001:4. The source of
information is U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA Table 2.1.
Price Deator
The nominal wealth, after-tax income, consumption, and interest rates were deated by the personal
consumption expenditure chain-type price deator (2000=100), seasonally adjusted. Data are quarterly.
Series comprises the period 1947:1-2005:4. The source of information is U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA Table 2.3.4., line 1.
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Ination Rate
Ination rate was computed from price deator. Data are quarterly. Series comprises the period
1947:2-2005:4. The source of information is U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analy-
sis, NIPA Table 2.3.4, line 1.
Interest Rate ("Risk-Free Rate")
Risk-free rate is dened as the 3-month U.S. Treasury bills real interest rate. Original data are
monthly and are converted to a quarterly frequency by computing the simple arithmetic average of
three consecutive months. Additionally, real interest rates are computed as the di¤erence between
nominal interest rates and the ination rate. The 3-month U.S. Treasury bills real interest rateseries
comprises the period 1947:2-2005:4, and the source of information is the H.15 publication of the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
B Derivation of the Risky Asset Share
The dynamics of the linear habit presented in Equation (2) can be written as a di¤erential equation
as:
dXt = (bCt   aXt) dt; (13)
and the wealth dynamics (Equation (3)) becomes:
dWt
Wt
=

(r + t (t   r)) 
Ct
Wt

dt+ p;tdZt: (14)
Both di¤erential equations involve the consumption term of the agent.
Following Schroder and Skiadas (2002), the agents consumption can be written in terms of the
consumption of an agent without habit. Let
^
Ct=
^
W t be the consumption-wealth ratio of an agent
without habit. If expected returns are not time-varying,
^
Ct=
^
W t is constant. The optimal consumption-
wealth ratio of an agent with habit is given by
Ct
Wt
=
Xt
Wt
+ (
r + a  b  XtWt
r + a  b+ 1 )
^
Ct
^
W t
= f(
Xt
Wt
;
^
Ct
^
W t
); (15)
and is a function of Xt=Wt.
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Replacing the drift term of the wealth di¤erential equation with W (t;
Xt
Wt
;
^
Ct
^
W t
t) := r + t(t  
r)  f(XtWt ;
^
Ct
^
W t
), dening wt := log(Wt), and applying Itos lemma, one obtains
dwt = w
0@t; Xt
Wt
;
^
Ct
^
W t
; t
1A dt  p;tdZt; (16)
where w

t;
Xt
Wt
;
^
Ct
^
W t
; t

:= W

t;
Xt
Wt
;
^
Ct
^
W t
; t

  122p;t.
Similarly, substituting consumption out of the dX equation yields:
dXt =
0@bWtf(Xt
Wt
;
^
Ct
^
W t
)  aXt
1A dt: (17)
Applying Itos lemma to xt := log(Xt), one obtains:
dxt =
0BB@bf(
Xt
Wt
;
^
Ct
^
W t
)
Xt
Wt
  a
1CCA dt =: x
0@Xt
Wt
;
^
Ct
^
W t
1A dt: (18)
Dening yt := log

Xt
Wt

= xt   wt, it follows that:
dyt =
0@x
0@Xt
Wt
;
^
Ct
^
W t
1A  w
0@t; Xt
Wt
;
^
Ct
^
W t
; t
1A1A dt  p;tdZt: (19)
Equation (4) can now be written as:
t =

1  e
yt
r + a  b

^
t: (20)
Applying Itos lemma again, one gets:
dt =   ^t e
yt
r + a  b

dyt +
1
2
2p;t

: (21)
Using 1  t
^
t
= e
yt
r+a b ,
dt =  

^
t   t

dyt +
1
2
2p;t

=

^
t   t

dwt   dxt   1
2
2p;t

(22)
=

^
t   t
8<:
24w
0@t; Xt
Wt
;
^
Ct
^
W t
; t
1A  x
0@Xt
Wt
;
^
Ct
^
W t
1A  1
2
2p;t
35 dt+ p;tdZt
9=; : (23)
Finally, dening t := log(t), and from Itos lemma Equation (5), it follows that:
dt =
 
^
t
t
  1
!8<:
24w
0@t; Xt
Wt
;
^
Ct
^
W t
; t
1A  x
0@Xt
Wt
;
^
Ct
^
W t
1A  1
2
2p;t  
1
2
 
^
t   t
t
!
2p;t
35 dt+ p;tdZt
9=;
(24)
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= 
^
t
t
  1
!8<:
24w
0@t; Xt
Wt
;
^
Ct
^
W t
; t
1A  x
0@Xt
Wt
;
^
Ct
^
W t
1A  ^t
2t
2p;t
35 dt+ p;tdZt
9=; : (25)
C Estimation of Wealth Shocks
In order to model the wealth process, I experimented with several specications in the ARIMA
class, and performed the standard set of Box-Jenkins selection procedures. In particular, among the
models considered, ARMA(2,3) process ts well to rst di¤erences of log wealth and hence I restricted
attention to the ARIMA(2,1,3) specication for log wealth. Thus, the tted wealth specication is:
wt = w + 1wt 1 + 2wt 2 + t + #1t 1 + #2t 2 + #3t 3
where t is the time t innovation, s are auto-regressive coe¢ cients and #s are moving average coe¢ -
cients. The estimated coe¢ cients are reported in Table C.1.
Table C1: Estimated wealth process.
^
w
^
1
^
2
^
#1
^
#2
^
#3
0.006 0.379 -0.896 -0.320 0.943 0.110
(0.0016) (0.0336) (0.0371) (0.0868) (0.0394) (0.0817)
Newey-West standard errors appear in parenthesis.
D Human Wealth
Julliard (2004) points out that claims on non-traded labor income represent roughly two thirds
of overall wealth in the major industrialized countries. Following Roll (1977)s critique, the literature
has recognized the importance of human wealth returns as part of the market return (Shiller, 1995;
Campbell, 1996; Jagannathan and Wang, 1996).
If labor income was riskless, then human wealth, Ht, would be considered as a riskless asset. Ad-
ditionally, since human wealth is non-tradeable, the optimal portfolio shares, t and
^
t, would be the
shares of risky assets in total wealth including human wealth (Campbell and Viceira, 2002). Denoting
non-human wealth by Wt, and dening N;t as the share of risky assets in non-human wealth, then:
N;tWt = t(Wt +Ht): (26)
With N;t := log(N;t), it is possible to derive:
dN;t = dt + d log(Wt+Ht)  d log(Wt): (27)
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Using Itos Lemma, one obtains
dN;t = dt +  tdt  tp;tdZt; (28)
where t := HtWt+Ht , and  t is a time-varying drift term. Therefore, even though a positive shock
to non-human wealth (dZt > 0) leads to dt > 0, it is not clear that dN;t > 0, because there is
a countervailing e¤ect ( tp;tdZt < 0). Consequently, the wealth shock should be interacted with
t, which is related to the human wealth/total wealth ratio Ht=Wt. Human wealth is approximated
to current labor income, Yt, times a (growing) annuity factor, A, as it is not directly observable, i.e.
t  a0+a1 (yt   wt)+ log (A), where yt is the log labor income. Table D.1 summarizes the estimations
for which income growth is included as an explanatory variable, suggesting that it is not an important
determinant of portfolio composition.
On the other hand, if labor income is risky but uncorrelated with risky asset returns, the direction
of the e¤ect would be the same but smaller in magnitude. By its turn, if labor income is positively
correlated with asset returns, the e¤ects of labor income can go in the opposite direction and the e¤ects
of wealth shocks could be amplied rather than dampened. As a robustness check, I replace income
growth by income shocks - proxied by the residuals of the labor income growth equation from the
reduced-form vector auto-regression model (VAR) - as an explanatory variable. Table D.2 shows that
the coe¢ cients associated to income shocks are small in magnitude and not signicant. Therefore, the
risky labor income story does not change the previous results.
Table D1: Asset allocation and human wealth.
Financial Home Stock Market Stock Market Wealth Stock Market Wealth
Wealth Wealth Wealth Directly held Indirectly held
1t 
2
t 
3
t 
4
t 
5
t
Constant 0.000 -0.000 0.005 0.001 0.014*
(0.206) (-0.256) (1.394) (0.238) (4.551)
"t 0.163* -0.785* 2.697* 2.819* 2.305*
(7.547) (-7.697) (11.747) (12.102) (10.349)
yt -0.028 0.135 -0.134 -0.089 -0.121
(-1.031) (1.098) (-0.443) (-0.268) (-0.419)
_
R
2
[0.41] [0.45] [0.69] [0.68] [0.57]
Symbols *, **, *** represent, respectively, signicance level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Newey and West (1987) corrected t-statistics appear in parenthesis.
The sample period is 1953:4 to 2004:4.
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Table D2: Asset allocation and income risk - labor income shocks from VAR system.
Financial Home Stock Market Stock Market Wealth Stock Market Wealth
Wealth Wealth Wealth Directly held Indirectly held
1t 
2
t 
3
t 
4
t 
5
t
Constant -0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.013*
(-0.238) (0.220) (1.405) (0.129) (4.689)
"t 0.158* -0.761* 2.663* 2.790* 2.272*
(7.327) (-7.476) (11.409) (11.798) (10.091)
yt 0.026 -0.117 0.255 0.269 0.265
(0.894) (-0.930) (0.819) (0.746) (0.953)
_
R
2
[0.41] [0.45] [0.69] [0.68] [0.57]
Symbols *, **, *** represent, respectively, signicance level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Newey and West (1987) corrected t-statistics appear in parenthesis.
The sample period is 1953:4 to 2004:4.
Finally, Table D. 3 estimates the role of human capital returns on asset allocation, following the
computation described in Appendix A. The results show that returns on human capital are not impor-
tant determinants of the changes in portfolio composition: the coe¢ cients are small in magnitude and
not signicant.
Table D3: Asset allocation and returns on human capital.
Financial Home Stock Market Stock Market Wealth Stock Market Wealth
Wealth Wealth Wealth Directly held Indirectly held
1t 
2
t 
3
t 
4
t 
5
t
Constant -0.000 0.000 0.003 -0.017* 0.011*
(-0.129) (0.050) (0.882) (-4.709) (3.875)
"t 0.160* -0.776* 2.693* 2.844* 2.275*
(7.094) (-7.260) (11.280) (12.227) (9.994)
rht 0.006 -0.005 0.462 0.224 0.606**
(0.215) (-0.039) (1.614) (0.777) (2.336)
_
R
2
[0.41] [0.45] [0.69] [0.72] [0.58]
Symbols *, **, *** represent, respectively, signicance level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Newey and West (1987) corrected t-statistics appear in parenthesis.
The sample period is 1953:4 to 2002:4.
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E Assessing Uncertainty
To assess uncertainty in the regression results in Table 21, I report 95 percent condence intervals for
the estimated slope coe¢ cients constructed via Monte Carlo integration by drawing from the posterior
distribution of the estimated VAR coe¢ cients. I proceed as follows:
1. I draw covariance matrices
8
 from the inverse Wishart with parameters (n
^
) 1 and n m.
2. Conditional on
8
, I draw a vector of coe¢ cients for the VAR,
8
, from
8
  N(
^
;
8

 (X 0X) 1).
3. I repeat this procedure 50,000 times and construct the median and slope OLS coe¢ cients associ-
ated to the VAR, and the 95 percent condence intervals from the Monte Carlo iterations.
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